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Abstract 
This study explores the key factors of successful collaboration project between a startup and 
a big company. Due to the recent changes in digitalizing business environment and  
customer’s buying behavior, several companies have showed interest to collaborate with 
startups that are operating in the same business field. By collaborating with small and  
innovative startup companies the big companies are usually willing to improve their own  
product development processes, test new ideas and eliminate their possible competitors as 
early as possible. 
 
This research is based on one case study, Media Startup Accelerator Program where Yle 
collaborated with eight early-stage startups. The program was executed in the autumn of 
2014 by startup accelerator Nestholma in partnership with Yle, the Finnish Broadcasting 
Company.  
 
The goal of the study is to find out which were the key elements of successful collaboration in 
this case and which factors could be improved in upcoming accelerator projects. I’m trying to 
identify the benefits for a big company of participating in an accelerator program, and to  
evaluate when an accelerator program is not the best way to start the startup collaboration. In 
the end, I provide a toolkit based on the case, which might help big companies planning to get 
started with startup collaboration. 
 
The research approach in this study is qualitative and case study is used as a research  
method. I interviewed six key persons who were involved in the accelerator project. 
 
As result of this research, the most relevant factors that a big company should consider  
before getting started with a startup accelerator are identifying their own weaknesses and 
possibilities, involving the right people in the project, setting relevant goals for the project and 
having an effective and an open communication during the project. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Topic 
 
This thesis focuses on the collaboration process between a big company and a startup. The 
basis of this study is a case where Yle (Yleisradio, Finnish Broadcasting Company) decided to 
collaborate with startup accelerator Nestholma in order to improve Yle's product development 
and innovation process. 
 
There is a growing interest for large corporations to collaborate with startup companies; the 
corporate efforts to reach out to the startup ecosystem have been increasing during the last few 
years and the amount of various startup accelerators has increased quickly (Freixas et al. 2013, 
Vascellaro 2011, Weiblen&Chesbrough 2015). An increasing number of big corporations have 
embraced collaboration with startups as a key element of their innovation strategy (Burfield 2014). 
However, it’s sometimes very unclear how the collaboration should be arranged and managed. In 
recent years several startup accelerators have brought startups and big companies together. But how 
is the system working? Why should big companies invest their resources in startup collaboration, 
and what kind of roles should the key actors inside a big company take when executing the process.  
 
However, there is relatively little research covering this topic, mostly because the trend of 
startup collaborations has emerged only several years ago. Due to this, there are many 
dimensions in organizing startup collaborations that I’m going to deal only superficially and 
only focus on selected aspects of the process. 
 
Media has changed significantly during the past years. Because of the changes in the media 
field, Yle was looking for new ways to work. Yle as an organization has a strong position in the 
operational environment of media in Finland. For many years Yle used to do all their 
innovation and development work within their organization, using their own resources. Some 
years ago Yle realized that they’re unable to keep their customers if they can’t react faster on 
changes in the industry. According to the interviews conducted for this study, that’s why Yle 
started to open their operations and look for new innovations outside the company. The old 
working philosophy of doing everything independently didn’t work anymore.  
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1.2 Positioning the research  
 
Big companies are facing challenges in their product development processes. Pressure from 
increased competition, shorter product life cycles and growing product complexity are making 
big companies willing to change the way they develop new technologies, products and services. 
In many sectors there has been a trend where the traditional, closed product development 
process is slowly being replaced by a more open model of innovation. This happens because 
companies realize they can no longer afford to rely only on their own research and 
development and need to acquire ideas from outside their own organization (University of 
Cambridge, IfM Briefing 2006.). In many cases, big companies are turning to startups for 
solutions. There is no clear strategy on how the collaboration process should be organized. 
Should big companies arrange their cooperation processes independently and try to find 
promising startups and establish relationships with them? Or should they rather set up an 
accelerator program, and let the program search and choose the most suitable startups for their 
needs? The concept of startup cooperation and startup accelerators is relatively new. Involving 
startups in big company's business operations is one way to outsource the product development 
process and to create competitive advantages. 
 
 
1.3 The research context  
 
This thesis focuses on the collaboration process between a big company and a startup. The goal 
of the research is to identify and discuss the success factors in corporate start-up accelerator 
projects. The research focuses on one case example: Nestholma’s Media Startup Accelerator 
Program. The program was arranged in 2014 in Helsinki, in cooperation with Yle, the Finnish 
Broadcasting Company. Out of around one hundred startup companies that applied into the 
program, eight were selected to participate in it. The aim of the program for startups was to 
accelerate their business, for Yle to get their employees to familiarize themselves with the 
startup culture and to potentially benefit from startup’s innovations and for Nestholma to invest 
in potential growing businesses. 
 
This case study illustrates an example of an accelerator program in Finland that was executed 
in cooperation with a big company. In the discussion section these learnings and outcomes are 
combined with previous knowledge about how to build successful accelerators and organize 
collaboration between startups and big companies. This research is filling the gap that has not 
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yet been studied extensively, but is a growing trend in Finland as well. The toolkit provided at 
the end of this research may be a useful guide for big companies that are considering to 
collaborate with startups, or to participate in an accelerator or to run an internal accelerator 
program. 
         
 
 
 
Problems of corporational product development process 
 
 
Collaboration process with startup accelerators 
 
 
Analysing one case study 
 
 
Identifying the success factors 
of the collaboration process 
 
 
 
Picture 1. Positioning the research 
 
 
1.4 The research problem  
 
The research problem can be seen as a funnel: first, big companies are probably facing 
challenges in their product development processes because of competition and rapidly changing 
market environments. After potentially deciding to improve their product development process 
by starting a cooperation process with a startup accelerator the broad question is, how should 
the cooperation be arranged? Because this question is too broad to be answered 
comprehensively in this research, I'm picking up some relevant success factors in corporate 
startup accelerator projects and discussing them side by side with the literature. The questions 
this research aims to answer are: 
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1. What can collaboration with a startup accelerator give for a big company? 
2. What makes a successful startup accelerator program? 
3. What to consider before participating in a startup accelerator? 
 
This study is mostly examined from the viewpoint of a big company, but a startup’s, an 
accelerator provider’s and an investor’s viewpoints are also briefly covered. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
 
This chapter first introduces first several product development approaches that are used by big 
companies. An overview of the process is provided on a very general level, because the product 
development processes varies significantly depending on industry and the customers that the 
company is doing business with. For example consumer goods need different attention than 
business-to-business products. After that I provide some examples of customer integration into the 
product development process and introduce problems that companies are nowadays facing with 
their product development processes in a rapidly changing business environment. 
  
After that, I’m showing what kind of solutions startups could provide to companies who are 
willing to improve their product development processes. I provide examples of different ways 
to organize the collaboration process with startups and clarify the differences between 
accelerators, incubators and angel investing. I briefly introduce the history of startup 
accelerators and the current stage of collaborations between startups and big companies in 
Finland, the benefits for different parties (startups, big companies, investors) and the 
characteristics of a successful accelerator program. I also discuss the possible downsides and 
risks that an accelerator may face. 
 
 
2.1 The product development processes in big corporations 
 
The product development process in a company usually consists of opportunity identification or 
idea generation, preliminary market research, technical assessment, detailed market study, 
business analysis, marketing strategy, design process, testing, launching and life cycle 
management. Often many of these phases happen before even developing the actual product or 
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asking the potential customer how they feel about the product. Product innovation contributes 
to the renewal of the firm and its competences, which is particularly important in the current 
dynamic environment, which requires firms to renew their competences in order to survive and 
prosper (Danneels 2002). As in picture 2, the product development process consists of product 
definition, planning, manufacturing and delivery processes. 
 
Traditionally the whole product development process in big companies has been conducted 
internally (Stark 2015, 2; Ylimäki 2014). The common product development process paradigm 
involves repeatedly the same departments and employees in the process. In manufacturing 
companies, the marketing department often decides which products the company starts to produce, 
then the engineering department designs them and the manufacturing department produces them. 
This cycle is then repeated and this process is generally applied in many companies, mainly because 
the specialist in every department are perceived to be the best ones to be responsible for specific 
functions (Stark 2015, 2.).  
 
 
Picture 2. An example of typical product development process in big company. (Source: 
http://www.finetubes.co.uk/) 
 
According to Griffin (1997, 440) informal product development prosesses do not produce 
successful products as often as very structured processes. However, even the stuctured 
development processes can be very different. In 1990’s, more than half of the companies they 
researched were using more than one different structure for product innovation and 
development. Utterback & Abernathe (1975) see a relationship between a firm's choice of a 
product development strategy and its environment. For example, the competitive situation in 
the market affects the way a company’s productive resources are deployed. 
 
With effective product innovations the organizations can adapt to changes in markets, technology, 
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and competition. Nowadays organizations are especially challenged hy changes in technology and 
global competition. Innovation and ability to develop new products are the keys to survive, and 
changes in product development processes seems necessary (Dougherty&Hardy 1996). Also instead 
of allocating product innovation resources based on current and previous sales, Kwaku (2005) 
suggests companies to do more sensitive allocating based on market situation in general.  
 
Veryzer (1998, 308) introduces several highly structured approaches for managing the product 
development process that emerged in the early 90’s. These approaches mainly develop the 
process into different structured stages that aim to help managing risk and increasing the 
efficiency of the development process. One model, the value proposition process, emphasizes 
the importance of continuous development and learning, which from today’s perspective is a 
very current dimension in the product development process in almost every company.  
 
Today’s product development processes might be more flexible and, instead of one comprehensive 
development process, companies are running multiple projects at the same time, even if the goal 
would be just to launch one new product. Takeuchi and Nonaka predicted already in 1986 that the 
rules of the product development project are changing. They researched several companies in Japan 
and United States that took a new kind of approach for their product development processes. In 
most cases, the top-management gave individual project teams the freedom to innovate and build 
new products independently. The development process was not strictly controlled and different 
development phases were often overlapping. According to them, a bottleneck in one phase can slow 
or even halt the entire development process. 
 
Today one of the best-known examples of lean processes in action is Morgan and Liker’s (2006) 
Toyota Production System (TPS). It has become a model for competitive manufacturing throughout 
the world. According to them, nowadays every manufacturing company needs to have some sort of 
a “lean” program to be competitive. 
 
Morgan and Liker (2006) categorize new product development processes based on innovation 
level as following: 
1. Revolutionary new products that represent radically different products or technology 
2. Product platform-development projects that require fundamentally new systems and 
components 
3. Derivate products built on existing product platforms 
4. Incremental product improvements 
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That is however only one way to categorize product development processes. Utterback and 
Abernathe (1975) introduced three other product innovation approaches. They paid attention to 
market segmentation and the competitive advantage that the firm is willing to achieve by 
developing new products. First, firms can focus on performance maximizing by being the first 
to introduce technically advanced products. Second, firms can try sales maximizing by 
watching first others innovate and then quickly adapt and introduce new product variations and 
features. The third possibility is to try the cost-minimizing approach, which means entering the 
market later with simpler and less expensive versions. 
 
 
2.1.1 Involving customers in the product development process 
  
Nowadays companies have gradually started to open up their innovation process to involve 
customers and other parties in it. Ylimäki (2014, 997) describes how customer involvement can 
be seen as “interaction between customers and the design process” which can be suggested to 
lead to better innovation performance by helping companies recognize market and technology 
opportunities, generate new ideas and prevent them from developing poor designs (Lin, Chen 
& Chiu 2010; Tsai 2009; Von Hippel 1988). In previous research of big companies product 
development process, radical innovations have largely been ignored (Veryzer 1998). 
 
Freel (2003) sees internal know-how and experience as key to new innovation. According to 
him, innovations often reflect already existing knowledge in the organization, just combined in 
new ways. This aspect is somehow the opposite to the viewpoint in which customers should 
drive the product development process. Ylimäki (2014) introduces a three-step customer 
involvement collaboration model (based on Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz, 2005). In the first 
level of collaboration the company is responsible for solving a customer’s problem, while in 
the second level of development collaboration the cooperation between a supplier and a 
customer plays the most important role. In the third level, the customer drives the whole 
product development process. 
 
According to Danneels (2002), product innovation requires the firm to have competences related to 
technology and to customers, and each of these competences is constituted by a set of resources. He 
uses the term ‘customer competence’ instead of ‘market competence’ to highlight the customers as 
the central element of the product development process. Customers play an active role in a firm’s 
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competence development through their influence on the new products a firm pursues. When 
managers seek to develop additional customer competences through product innovation, they need 
to deliberately seek input from new customers and to evaluate which resources are needed to 
address those customers. 
 
Customer competence is constituted by such market-related resources as: knowledge of customer 
needs, preferences, and purchasing procedures, distribution and sales access to customers, customer 
goodwill or franchise reflected in the reputation of the firm and its brands, and communication 
channels for exchange. Technological competence instead gives the firm the ability to design and 
manufacture a physical product with certain features. Technological competence is constituted by 
such technically related resources as: design and engineering know-how, product and process 
design equipment, manufacturing facilities and know-how, and procedures for quality control. 
Danneels (2002) highlights that technological and customer competences need to be linked in order 
to achieve successful innovations.  
 
 
Picture 3. Linking product innovation activies by type (Danneels, 2002).  
 
 
According to Veryzer (1998), during a new product development process the idea of the 
product is evaluated based on the market opportunity and customer need already in a very early 
phase. After positive evaluations the technical features can be examined more carefully and the 
process can move to the design phase. In case the new product relies on a new technology or 
the product itself is unknown to its potential customers, the process likely needs more attention. 
Still, improving and shortening the product development process cycle could bring significant 
savings to a company and help them to test more ideas in a shorter time period and to pick the 
most potential ones for further development. 
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The importance of integrating the customer into new product development is widely accepted, 
but the techniques to identify customers' needs can be outdated. Several often used techniques, 
such as focus groups, questionnaires and surveys have significant limitations and customers 
often have difficulties identifying their real needs in interview situations because they are not 
completely aware of their own needs. Integrating customers to a new product development 
process with the help of questionnaires or interviews can be problematic: Questions may not be 
effective enough to find out the most important features of a product and how customers will 
use and like it. In a focus group, the attendees can meet in a neutral location and discuss about a 
given topic more flexibly than in structured surveys and also interact with each other. However, 
this takes place outside the customer's normal environment, which may lead to customers 
probably being unable to actually provide information about how they really use the product in 
their personal environment and in which context they use it. Especially when it comes to the 
consumption of services, it can be difficult for consumers to articulate their real needs in an 
interview. Surveys and interviews may be complemented with new techniques if companies 
aim to develop breakthrough ideas. (Goffin et al. 2012, 46.) 
                    
Ethnography can be an efficient technique for conducting in-depth studies in order to discover 
customers' hidden needs. It combines several techniques, but the main idea is to talk to 
customers in their own environments, where they also tend to be more open and honest in their 
answers. In ethnographic research customers can be directly observed when using products 
rather than relying on explanations of how they use products. (Goffin et al. 2012, 46.) Two 
useful ethnographic methods are contextual interviewing and systematic observation. Both of 
these tools focus on studying customers and users in their own environments, such as in their 
homes or, if the target group is employees, in their work places. According to Goffin et al. 
(2012), this practice recognizes the fact that people act and react differently depending on 
where they are. For example, they may be more open to discussing personal issues at home 
than they are when interviewed somewhere else. 
 
 
2.1.2 Challenges in product development processes today 
 
Globalization opens new market areas and results in growing worldwide competition. 
Fast changing market trends, more complex products and shorter product life cycles are setting new 
challenges to companies and their innovation processes (Stark 2015, 50). Companies have to be 
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able to adapt to these trends in order to stay in business. Good resources or excellent market 
knowledge are not enough if a big company lacks innovation and the ability to respond to changing 
customer demands. It might be that some corporations are not even aware of the changing trends in 
the market. Also, different markets could be approached with potentially different business partners 
that often have cultural knowledge about a certain market area (Karniel & Reich 2011). 
 
Adopting forward-looking business strategies is the key to managing successful innovations in 
a modern business enterprise. According to Sengupta (2014), new technologies and market 
growth are providing the key components of the modern theory of innovation and making it 
possible to build collaborative ventures in R&D processes. 
 
There are several drivers that keep pushing the corporational product development process. 
According to Stark (2015), the most important drivers are same issues that are changing the 
world from other perspectives too, such as globalization, mobile communications and increased 
competition (for full list see table 1). 
 
Table 1. The drivers pushing the product development processes. (Stark, 2015) 
  
 
The success or a failure of a product is always more or less the result of a product development 
process (Veryzer 1998). The development processes of new products are complex, unique and 
challenging and unfortunately quite many of them fail. One of reasons for failure is the management 
of the development process for a new product (Karniel & Reich 2011). However, new successful 
products are not the only way to grow sales constantly. Often big companies focus too much on 
growing their existing business and maximizing profits while smaller companies are developing 
new innovations (Chandy & Tellis 2000).  
 
Wasting time and resources for unnecessary development work is a common problem. 
Companies should be able to choose as early as possible which products they find successful 
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and to kill the unsuccessful ones quickly. However, not all risks can be eliminated. For radical, 
technology-based new innovations the market opportunities are often unclear and the product 
development process often takes several years (Veryzer 1998, 308). Goldenberg et al. (2001, 
69) points out that the success rate of new product introduction is relatively low and it should 
make companies identify predictive guidelines earlier in the product development process in 
order to make better choices and to avoid unnecessary costs and to continue promoting those 
products that potentially are successful. 
 
A problem of the product development process has often been the lack of communication and 
interaction between different dimensions of the process. Leonard-Barton (1992, 114) introduces 
a model of four dimensions of core capabilities in a product development process (see picture 
4). The first three dimensions of a process include skills and knowledge base, technical systems 
and managerial systems, which are then combined by the fourth dimension, values and norms. 
All these core capabilities are a collection of knowledge sets and, due to that, are also 
constantly changing. She reminds that in a product development process these dimensions can’t 
be managed separately and interaction between the different dimensions is needed in order to 
be innovative. However, interaction may not always happen because it would challenge the 
adapted ways of doing things in a company (Leonard-Barton 1992, 123). 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 4. The four dimensions of core capabilities. (According to Leonard-Barton 1992). 
Skills and 
knowledge base 
Managerial  
systems 
Values and norms 
Technical 
systems 
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Another problem with testing new innovations can be the unwillingness to change the brand 
image of the company. Because there are more misses than hits when it comes to new product 
launches the companies may not want to test new ideas under their own brands. If big 
companies try to stretch their brands too much, there is a risk of failure because customers can’t 
adopt the new product because it doesn’t fit within the company’s existing brand image 
(Burkitt 2010). When making new innovations and testing new products, companies should 
also ensure that there are enough customers who are willing to buy the new product before the 
company invests in production (Bort 2013). 
 
One major challenge with technically advanced products is the high degree of uncertainty about 
their market potential. There might be several suitable technologies available to meet certain market 
needs. Innovation may often arise from unexpected sources or directions. Performance-maximizing 
firms are expected to rely more heavily on external sources of information, and on more diverse 
sources of information than other firms. According to Utterback & Abernathe (1975, 643), 
relatively few firms can dominate an industry, and the market entrants will either be small, new 
firms or older firms entering a completely new market based on their existing technological 
strengths.  
 
Innovation could be seen as a business skill that executives and employees can develop and 
master (Jaruzelski & Loehr & Holman 2012).  Innovation management is the discipline of 
managing processes in innovation. It allows the organization to respond to external or internal 
opportunities, and use its creativity for new ideas and processes or products. Innovation 
management involves workers at every level in the organization, giving them a possibility to 
contribute creatively to a company's product development, manufacturing and marketing 
processes. (Bhakkad & Patil 2014, 35.) 
 
If companies are willing to speed up their innovation process and innovate with lean 
methodology, they should, instead of blindly trying to develop new products, search for product 
or market fit and try to solve current problems their customers may have (Christensen 1997). 
It’s also important to have capable people managing the innovation and making sure they have 
right tools to make things happen. According to GE Global Innovation Barometer (2014), 
innovation executives are feeling overwhelmed by the different options. As a solution to the 
rapidly changing market, they have started to actively look for talents, technologies and 
partners to make innovation happen.  
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Another major problem in corporate product development processes is focusing too much on 
improving the existing products instead of trying to find new business models or technologies 
outside of the box. Nokia is a good example of doing both. First they successfully switched to 
mobile business and made a success story with cell phones, then getting blind and stocked with 
certain technologies and crashing down again. Christensen (1997) instead considers that when the 
best firms succeeded, they did so because they listened responsively to their customers and invested 
aggressively in the technology and products that satisfied their customers' next-generation needs. 
He also sees that when those firms failed, it was for the same reasons. He claims that for established 
firms, finding new applications and markets for their new products seems to be a capability that 
each of these firms exhibited once, upon entry, and then apparently lost (Christensen 1997, 14). 
 
  
2.2 Improving the product development process with startups 
 
From corporate perspective, the most radical innovations often come from smaller companies. 
Some of those innovations may create new markets and bring down existing giants (Chandy & 
Tellis 2000). Big companies might be blind for changes in the market or they can’t adjust their 
own products or marketing strategies to fit the current demand. At the same time, many agile 
startup companies come from outside the existing status quo and do things in a way that the 
market can’t expect (Burfield 2014). In the best case, big companies could transform startups 
into engines of their corporate innovation (Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015). It’s also possible that 
there are interesting new ideas and promising technologies developed inside a corporation, but 
those ideas are not fitting into their current product portfolio or core business. To profit from 
those internal innovations, corporate incubators have emerged. With incubator programs 
companies can test and bring innovation to market as new companies (Weiblen & Chesbrough 
2015, 71).  
 
Bringing together small innovative companies and big corporations could help the small ones 
to make bigger market entries and the big ones to develop better product faster. At the same 
time, the big ones can eliminate their potential competitors. Also according to Weiblen & 
Chesbrough’s (2015) research, startups are more agile than large corporations and the 
combination of entrepreneurial activity with corporate ability seems like a perfect match, but 
can be elusive to achieve. It could be worth trying, because at the same time large corporations 
sit on resources which startups can only dream of.  
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There are different ways to collaborate with startups in product development. Weiblen & 
Chesbrough (2015) introduce two structured collaboration models. In their research, they 
screened the startup support landscape for ways in which corporations from the tech industry 
engage with startups. Their results are based on a series of interviews and available literature. 
 
According to the research, probably the clearest and simplest way to get started is to provide 
some corporate venture capital for a separate innovation project within the company that will 
work like an independent team, but has the same strategic goals as the corporation. This setup 
provides flexibility, speed, freedom and still provides excellent possibilities to collaborate with 
the R&D department and to mutually share knowlegde and experiences. However, for all 
startups corporate venture capital is not the best possible choice. Even though it might be 
beneficial that the corporation can provide market insight, technical help, capital and other 
resources, the startup will more or less betied to the funding company which can limit its 
possibilities significantly, such as collaborating with other companies or pivoting. On the other 
hand, it’s also possible that corporate business goals change over time. (Weiblen & Chesbrough 
2015, 70.) 
 
When a company has an interest to outsource their product development processes, they can 
look for suitable startups to form partnerships with and to agree mutual terms and conditions of 
relationship. Another alternative is to run innovation programs or internal startup accelerators. 
If a company is not interested in organizing and coordinating innovation or accelerator 
programs, they can form a partnership withan entity that coordinates the accelerator program 
for them and finds the most relevant and promising startups to suit the company’s needs. In this 
case the accelerator is completely operated by an external consultant or company. 
  
Sometimes, when dealing with a new project or idea, a big company can be interested in 
creating a spin-off company. A spin-off is a separated function or section of a business. 
According The Economist (2011) the reason for creating spin-offs can sometimes be the 
willingness to make a part of existing business easier to sell to suitable buyers. An internal 
corporate incubator is a relatively new concept. As an early example, Shell launched its 
corporate incubator as an offshoot of its R&D division almost 20 years ago. 
  
There can be several reasons for creating internal accelerators, for example to solve a specific 
problem or to try new innovations without hurting a company’s brand image. Companies can 
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also pick suitable projects to extend and amplify the power of their brands (Burkitt 2010, 
Villano 2013). According to Trotter (2013), the idea of an internal hatchery for startups has 
been dismissed by some as a flawed concept. On the other hand, it has also been embraced by 
others who believe that large companies can launch new ventures in order to drive sustainable 
and repeatable growth. In a nutshell, for startups participating in a company’s internal startup 
program means that they’re launching their ventures with the help from companies who has 
done it before (Villano 2013). 
 
Startups have also learned to work fast and effectively. The decision-making process has to be 
fast, because their resources are very limited and time can’t be wasted for too heavy R&D 
processes. When developing new products, startups need to ask their customers for their 
opinions. This may be one of the most effective ways to conduct product development and to 
co-create products with customers and even with competitors. On the other hand, big 
corporations, who are not working with such limited resources, keep using time for heavy and 
structured product development and innovation processes. 
 
Instead of corporate venture capital, some newer collaboration models, such as various 
structured collaboration models between big companies and startups, seem to be more effective 
and may build better bridges between them (Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015, 67). A framework 
for engagement should be developed based on the goals that big company is has when they start 
the collaboration process. 
 
Based on the existing literature, I have categorized startup collaboration types into six different 
categories (table 2). In the following chapters each collaboration model is explained in detail. 
 
 
Table 2.  Types of startup collaboration. 
1. Freely formed partnership 
2. Internal accelerator or innovation program 
3. External accelerator or innovation program 
4. Internal spin-off 
5. Acquisition 
6. Investing 
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2.2.1 Accelerators and incubators as a collaboration model 
 
A startup accelerator is formed to help startups focus on their core business and to help them 
grow. Even though every accelerator is different, the programs usually have several factors in 
common. Accelerators have application periods and startups apply to be part of a program, 
which typically lasts few months. The program typically involves a small amount of funding in 
exchange for company equity as well as office space, an innovative community, access to 
mentors and networks, bound within a short-term programme with founder-friendly terms. The 
accelerator program aims to enable exciting new businesses and to get a return on investment. 
Accelerator programs often aim to build bridges between innovators and corporate partners. 
They bring companies closer to startups through product development collaboration. (Bradford 
2014; Fankhauser 2013; Relan 2014.)  
 
Corporate incubators, as well as private incubators and accelerators, provide ventures with 
funding, office space, expertise, and contacts. The aim is to provide the founding team a 
startup-like environment in which radical innovation can grow better than in a traditional 
corporate environment. The target from a corporate’s viewpoint is that the grown-up spin-off 
will be able to conquer new markets independently or be re-integrated as a separate division. 
(Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015, 71.) 
 
 
Picture 5. An example of startup accelerator structure. (Source: www.catalyzer.co.) 
  
Accelerators in general are very similar to incubators, but the most fundamental difference is a 
limited duration. While the nature of incubators and angel investments is continuous, 
accelerator programs are always limited, relatively short time periods. However, accelerators 
often are repeated with several “rounds”, but the companiesparticipating in every round are 
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different. Typically programs last from three to six months. In most cases, accelerators end 
with a ”demo day” where startups pitch to a large audience of qualified investors (Cohen 2013, 
19). Incubators and accelerators are often formed of angel investors, venture capitalists, and 
others who are able to mentor startups and to help them grow their business (Keij 2014). 
However, these contacts could also be provided by a contact network of the accelerator 
provider. 
 
Cohen (2013) makes a distinction between accelerators, incubators and angel investing. 
Actually the content of accelerators and incubators is mostly overlapping, but those terms still 
have slightly different meanings. She tries to clarify the differences between accelerators, 
incubators and angel investing by charting and comparing the elements of each set-up. 
According to Keij (2014), incubators and accelerators both help businesses grow. Incubators 
assist companies in their infancy, whereas accelerators guide startups through future expansion 
and development. Fankhauser (2013) says that there were incubators before accelerators. In late 
1990’s incubators boomed along with tech companies; the model was to offer an office space 
for new companies in exchange for equity. She claims that the terms incubator and accelerator 
are still used interchangeably, but as a term, an accelerator is newer. 
 
This research focuses on accelerators that have limited duration and includes seed investing, 
mentoring, working premises and connections for startups. During the program startups focus 
on innovating, developing and launching their minimum viable products and looking for the 
next investments. 
  
 
2.2.2 Examples of existing accelerators and startup collaborations 
  
Nowadays there are many accelerators and incubators, and the number of various programs has 
increased quickly (Fankhauser 2013; Vascellaro 2011). Y-Combinator, the first seed 
accelerator, was launched in 2005 by investor Paul Graham. The Y-Combinator was followed 
by Techstars, Seedcamp and Startupbootcamp in the following five years. By 2011 there were 
around 200 different accelerators across the US and Europe (Gilani & Dettori 2011).  Today 
accelerators are known worldwide and some companies have started to run internal accelerator 
programs.  
  
The Y-Combinator has by 2015, according to the yclist.com, invested in more than 500 
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companies, including the success stories Dropbox and Airbnb. In the Y-Combinator the team 
behind the accelerator works with startups on their ideas. The goal is that the startup quickly 
gets the direction in which their business idea should be expanded to. In addition to this, they 
help the founders to learn how to deal with investors. To participate in the accelerator the 
startups have to move to Silicon Valley for three months. Each cycle in the accelerator program 
culminates in Demo Day. Before that the startups focus on getting the company into the best 
possible shape and making their pitch to investors as perfect as possible. After the accelerator 
program the Y-Combinator network continues to the help startups.  
  
Whereas the Y-Combinator focuses on shaping startups’ ideas and helping them to grow their 
business, the Techstars++ program takes the relationship between big companies and startups a 
step further. Startups that participate in a Techstars accelerator get a chance to spend two weeks 
working at the corporate headquarters of partner companies. There the startup teams receive 
hands-on mentorship and business development opportunities from the corporation’s network 
of executives, partners and community members. (Griffith 2014.) It seems that involving 
partner companies in accelerator programs is a recently added dimension for several existing 
programs.   
  
In recent years there have been several successful cases in Finland where startups and big 
companies have cooperated. For example the digital marketing company Fonecta moved out of 
their existing directory business and started to systematically invest in startups in order for 
them to develop innovations for the company. Outsourcing the product development process to 
startups can save both money and time. In 2014 a third of Fonecta’s employees had a startup 
background (EK 2014). Another company in Finland, Konecranes, started an internal startup 
accelerator that, according to the company, changed their corporate culture (EK 2014). 
Unfortunately, the report did not offer any concrete examples of the corporate culture change, 
but most likely the change is related to faster and more open innovation processes.  
 
At the moment there are several accelerators in Finland, such as Koppicatch and Gorilla 
Ventures, that both offer seed investing and acceleration, and Vertical, that mostly works with 
startups to develop their first minimum viable products. Also public sector in Finland has 
started to offer acceleration services for startups: the NewCo Helsinki accelerator has helped 
tens of startups to build their business and to get their first funding rounds. The program is fully 
powered by the city of Helsinki. 
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2.2.3 Alternative ways to benefit from startups: investments and acquisition 
  
If participating in an accelerator program or starting an internal accelerator doesn’t feel like a 
suitable option, there are also other possibilities to benefit from innovative startups. Big 
companies can invest in startups and become their partners. Sometimes the best choice can be 
an acquisition, where a startup is bought out by a bigger company. 
  
According to Blank (2014) there are two types of integration strategies, which depend on where 
the startup is in its lifecycle. An early-stage startup can be acquired because of their intellectual 
properties or for a capable team even though they might still be searching for a right business 
model. More mature startups can be sold based on their existing products, product lines, user 
bases, revenues and profits.  
  
For big companies, acquisitions can also be seen as risk management. Buying their potential 
competitors as early as possible will strengthen their own market position. When acquiring an 
early-stage startup, the acquiring company should ensure that they have resources for helping 
the startup to build their product forward. Sometimes it can be smarter to acquire a good team 
than a good product. A risk in this scenario is that if the current management team leaves, the 
customers may also leave subsequently. 
  
Acquisitions have also been criticized. Blank (2014) points out that the success of the 
acquisition depends on whether the acquiring company is willing to keep the new venture as a 
standalone division or, alternatively, integrate it into the corporation. In his opinion, if the 
startup is being acquired for its intellectual property and/or team, the company should integrate 
and assimilate it quickly. 
  
Instead of directly acquiring startups, big companies could also consider investing in them and 
outsource their product development processes to them. For example, some years ago 
Microsoft invested in several startups through their new angel fund and incubator program 
instead of just acquiring those companies.Other big companies, such as Dell and American 
Express, followed Microsoft’s example (Schawbel 2012). 
 
In addition to investing, accelerators and other “structured” collaboration models, it’s also 
possible to freely form a partnership between a company and a startup. There is no data 
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available how common this is or what kind of agreements are companies then making, if any. 
It’s also difficult to provide any examples of this kind of relationships, because those very often 
are not documented officially. 
 
 
2.3 Running an accelerator - common characteristics of a 
successful program 
 
This chapter takes a deeper look into the accelerator process. I’ll point out the benefits for 
different parties in the accelerator program and also discuss also the possible downsides and 
risks in an accelerator program. At the end of this section some examples of previous 
successful accelerator programs will be provided. 
  
 
2.3.1 Benefits for startups 
 
Accelerators can help startups define and build their initial products as well as to identify 
promising customer segments. Accelerator programs try to make startups focus on their core 
tasks and the new venture process. In addition to providing funding, accelerators usually 
provide startups with working space, mentorships and contacts to venture capitalists. (Cohen, 
2013, 19.) 
  
Usually accelerators also provide startups a community of other startups to work with, which 
can be very valuable because the challenges that startups are facing during their early phase 
might be very similar and the teams can support each other. By getting advice and hands-on 
support from the experienced mentors, some of the upcoming risks that an early-stage startup 
faces, concerning for example their business strategy or growth, could be eliminated. Besides 
the mentors, accelerators provide a wide range of investor connections for startups, including 
business partners the accelerator is cooperating with and angel investors. (Bradford 2014.) The 
investor that brings the needed capital into the program, can be the company, the accelerator or 
a private investor. 
  
According to Matthijs Keij (2014), the co-founder and CEO of FlxOne, a major benefit of an 
accelerator is that in that ecosystem startups can experience and learn from the mistakes of 
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others before they make them themselves. Startups will also get access to a strong network of 
business partners that likely would remain out of their reach without the accelerator program. 
Also, the benefits of an accelerator can last long after graduating from the program. According 
to a startup that graduated from Y-Combinator, the company has a "network you can tap into 
for the rest of your life" (Fankhauser 2013). Corporate accelerators also can provide startups 
very valuable access to their resources, including expensive equipment and access to their 
customer base (Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015, 71). 
 
Today being accepted into an accelerator or incubator can be seen as certification of quality. 
For example, Relan (2014) claims that in American culture entering an incubator is beginning 
to hold the same weight as being accepted into university. Incubators and accelerators may 
create a new education system where relevant real-world experience replaces traditional 
university studies. 
 
However, Founders of tech ventures today are in a situation that allows them to bring their ideas to 
market at much lower cost than in the early 2000s and in addition to this there are several 
supporting institutions available, such as govermental support and business schools (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough 2015, 67-68). 
 
  
2.3.2 Benefits for a big company 
 
Large companies have tried to become more entrepreneurial by adopting mechanisms like corporate 
venture capital, internal incubators, strategic alliances, and joint ventures. However, to make their 
company culture to change, they should rather engage with the startup community (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough 2015, 68). 
 
When talking about startup accelerators it’s often clear for startups how they benefit from 
participating the accelerator program. But what are the rewards from a big company’s 
perspective? Behind the growing interest to cooperate with accelerators and startups there 
might be reasons such as outsourcing the product development process or speeding up the 
process. For a big company it can also be just a way to do better problem solving. Or maybe 
they are looking for acquisitions or trying to strengthen their own market position by buying 
their competitors as early as possible.  
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Goldstein (2013) claims that a startup-corporate partnership gives certain freedoms to both 
parties. While corporations have the freedom to quickly pursue their market opportunities, 
startups have the freedom to execute innovative ideas with greater resources. Larger companies 
also benefit culturally from bringing a startup into their ecosystem: Old business models can be 
refreshed, perspectives shifted, and innovation abounds. In addition to this, Goldstein points out 
that technology is relatively inexpensive and is being rapidly developed by startups. And while 
corporations offer large distribution channels, they often look for innovative technologies to 
enhance their business quickly, without adding to their overhead. Sometimes even the 
opportunity for acquisition can make sense for both sides. 
  
According to the founder of YouWeb incubator Peter Relan (2014), cities with less tech culture 
could benefit from collaborating with startups and to learn together with them. This could be 
adapted to companies as well: less existing innovationand more collaboration with startups 
could bring added value. For a big company, working with startups can also mean using 
complementary resources for R&D processes. This of course depends on the deal a big 
company has made with the startup company. In addition to extended workforce, big company 
has a possibility for some information and working culture exchange. Learning from each 
other’s working cultures can alone be a good reason to start the collaboration.  
 
 
2.3.3 Can an accelerator fail?  
 
There are also possible downsides for big companies to participate in startup accelerators. It’s 
possible that the collaboration process can lengthen the product development cycle or increase 
the costs of the process, for example. According to the founder of YouWeb incubator Peter 
Relan (2014), as much as 90 percent of incubators will fail. By “failing,” he means that these 
incubators and accelerators don’t return the money that was invested in them. The claim he 
motivates by reminding, that actually incubators often are also startups, and the oft-cited rule of 
thumb is that 9 out of 10 startups fail. The reason for failing according to him can be having too 
few mentors and too many startups, lack of relevant funding paths after the accelerator program 
or lack of business development resources. 
 
Another challenge is finding the right startups. The startup ecosystem is growing fast and 
getting more and more global and corporations should be able to screen and identify larger 
numbers of startups than before. When there is more to choose from, the risk of choosing 
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wrong is much higher. Companies also must be aware of their value proposition towards a 
startup. If a big company promises too much added values, such as access to VCs or other 
support institutions, the expectations are not necessarily matching. A big company should also 
be very clear of what they want to get out of their engagement with startups. If the 
corporation’s strategic goals won’t match with the innovations that startups are able to provide, 
time can be wasted. (Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015, 68.) 
 
However, sometimes it can be good to fail. When giving startups an opportunity to test their 
ideas, they will still create innovations that can be reflected in the product technology in other 
spaces, even if the most of their previous ideas would fail (Relan 2014). Fankhauser (2013) 
points out that an accelerator can also be a stumbling block for entrepreneurs, and it's important 
to note that joining an accelerator is not a sure road to startup success. For example, if the 
accelerator requires relocation of the company or offering too much equity, which makes it 
more difficult for the startups to raise another round later as they'll have less equity to offer. For 
the corporation, failing may mean that the selected goals are not achieved. For example if the 
corporation is willing to develop new products or create new digital solutions, can the 
accelerator program be considered as failed if it is not provide those? If everything goes wrong, 
it’s also an opportunity to learn what didn’t work and why. Instead of ready solutions for their 
business challenges, the corporation has probably then learned something else about how 
startups are working and what is their way to do product development.  
 
 
2.3.4 What makes a successful accelerator program 
 
The success of an accelerator program depends first of all on the goals that are set for the 
program and the way success is defined. For a big company the benefits that accelerators can 
provide are typically varied. Reasons to participate in an accelerator program can, for example, 
be outsourcing the product development process or a willingness to speed it up.  
 
To benefit from the collaboration, it’s good for the big company to focus on selecting 
companies that are on the right development phase. In other words, not starting the 
collaboration too early or too late. In addition to successful timing, it’s also important to help 
startups to get funded also after the accelerator program. Otherwise there is a significant risk 
that startup will run out of money. Additionally for the big company it’s important to involve 
the right people in the accelerator program. For example, at Y-Combinator all partner 
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companies have entrepreneurial background and they have seen the potential risks realizing and 
they have learned their lessons. That makes it easier for them to help new companies to get 
started and avoid making the same mistakes. 
  
From an investor’s point of view investing in early-stage startups is very risky, but those few 
investments that are succesful are usually profitable enough to cover the losses from 
unsuccesful investments. For example, the seed fund model of Y-Combinator has so far been 
relatively successful. It combines a high-quality filter with a broad portfolio that has discovered 
a few breakaway companies and it has provided big returns to investors. For example, during 
the year 2014 Y-Combinator provided funding for almost 200 companies. Another example is 
YouWeb incubator, which since it’s founding in 2007 has relied on the “high-quality tech 
founder” and the “constant pivot” models. They don’t accept teams into their programs, but 
talented hackers, developers and technologists. Those individuals spends time building a 
product and launching it. If the product doesn't work, they will pivot to a new idea. (Relan 
2014.)  
  
Accelerator programs can be run in many different ways depending on the needs of each 
individual company. According to McConomy (2014), a successful corporate accelerator 
program consists of several elements. First of all, the program has to be backed by a clear 
strategy - and not just adding the coolest startups to a portfolio. Instead, she emphasizes that 
goals should be set and outcomes should be anticipated before choosing the appropriate 
startups. Second, companies should think about location. Instead of keeping startups inside a 
company’s premises, it would be good an idea to let them freely innovate and get inspired from 
the outside world. Third, the decision making process should be fast enough. In a startup, there 
are multiple decisions to be made daily and these decisions should be made effectively. When 
programs are done correctly, they can increase brand awareness and open the door to potential 
partnerships and investment opportunities for corporate brands. Both corporations and startups 
can benefit from programs when opportunities align with long-term business objectives. 
(McConomy 2014.) 
 
Romo (2014) raises a question: Should companies run their own corporate accelerator 
programs in-house or should they hire professional and renowned accelerators to manage these 
programs? According to him, startup acceleration should not become a “zero-sum game where 
established companies and accelerators fight against each other for deal flow, especially now 
that corporate-run accelerators start to outnumber privately-run accelerators.” He calls the 
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current time period as a golden age for entrepreneurship and venture capital when corporations 
are willing to run their own accelerator programs and include startups as a part of their 
business.  
  
However, there is no exact recipe to make an accelerator program a success. In an optimal case, 
all parties, including the accelerator provider, the partner company and the startups, are going 
to benefit from the program.  
 
 
3. Methodology and data collecting 
 
In this chapter the research method, research case, selection of the viewpoint and research units 
and the theoretical framework will be presented.  
 
This research is based on qualitative research methods. Qualitative business research gives a 
researcher an opportunity to focus on the complexity of business-related phenomena in their 
contexts. It produces new knowledge about how things work in real-life business contexts, why 
they work in a specific way, and how we can make sense of them in a way that they might be 
changed. Qualitative business research can also be used to provide a critical and a reflexive 
view about the social world of business and its core processes. This means that, as a qualitative 
researcher, you are willing to ask yourself what you are doing in your research, for what 
purpose, and with what kind of presumptions. Furthermore, as a critical and reflexive 
researcher, you are interested in how the decisions that you make during the research process 
shape what you see and find. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008.)  
 
There are different types of qualitative research approaches, such as case study, grounded 
theory, ethnographic research, focus group research, action research, and many others. One of 
the major interests of many qualitative research approaches is to understand reality as socially 
constructed: produced and interpreted through cultural meanings. In qualitative research, the 
way of collecting the data may affect the final results more than in quantitative research. 
Qualitative research is flexible because of ‘unstructured’ problems (Ghauri & Gronhaug 2005, 
202) 
  
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008, 4-10) claim, that qualitative research is often used to provide a 
  
26 
better understanding of research issues that would remain unclear by using only numerical data 
or other quantitative methods. Qualitative and quantitative methods are often combined. In 
social sciences and in business research the first phase of a study can be qualitative, followed 
by a quantitative phase (Silverman 2001, 32). In contrast, Eriksson and Kovalainen encourage 
researchers to use qualitative methods in business research also without any link to quantitative 
research. 
 
 
3.1 Introduction of the research case: The Media Startup Accelerator Program 
  
This research is based on the Media Startup Accelerator program that was executed in 2014 by 
Nestholma in collaboration with YLE (Finnish Broadcasting Company). The purpose of the 
program for Nestholma was to invest in potential early-stage startups, accelerate their 
businesses, provide mentoring and networks as well as building bridges between startups and 
big companies. Yle became interested in participating in the accelerator program after several 
discussions with Nestholma in early 2014. After agreeing on collaboration, Yle became an 
official partner for the program and together with Nestholma they started to develop 
operational matters for the upcoming project. The accelerator program itself was executed 
during the autumn of 2014 and it lasted three months. I worked in the project as Nestholma’s 
project coordinator. 
  
There have not been many accelerators in Finland yet, so big companies may not yet have the 
knowledge to run successful accelerator programs. The lessons from this case may not apply to 
all similar accelerators and different results could be achieved from different cases. The toolkit 
presented at the end of this study may be adapted to upcoming innovation processes in big 
companies. 
  
From around one hundred applications from all geographical areas a total of eight media-
related startup teams were selected to participate in the program. Most of the applied teams, as 
well as the selected ones, were from Finland, but almost every team had at least one team 
member with international background. Some of the companies were already established while 
some just had promising business ideas. A common factor was that the teams required essential 
resources and capabilities to start the business and to develop their minimum viable products. 
  
For Yle the program offered a unique possibility to work with startups and to utilize their 
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capabilities to come up with new innovations and to get help to develop their unused ideas. It 
was also a great branding occasion to be seen as an innovative organization willing to involve 
startups in their business operations. Yle offered the program premises from Loft Helsinki, 
their new creative co-working space located inside the Iso Paja building. In addition to free 
premises, Yle involved their key executives and managers in the program as mentors to help 
the startups and to describe Yle’s business for them. Yle nominated one specific mentor for 
every startup team. The nominated mentor was supposed to meet regularly with his/her startup 
and help them with their challenges. Every team got the possibility to discuss their business 
with all mentors at least once. 
  
Nestholma’s interest to run the program was the possibility to invest in promising startups, buy 
equity and to help startups to grow their business with the help of big companies. Nestholma 
invested 17.000 euros in every team that was accepted into the program in exchange for a share 
of their equity. Because of the equity stake, Nestholma has an incentive to support the startups 
also after the program and continue to provide their own mentor and contact networks for them. 
  
During the accelerator program startups were using the same co-working space at Loft Helsinki 
and got the possibility to be in contact with Yle every day. Every week Nestholma arranged 
workshops with different themes, guest speaker sessions and the possibility to book meetings 
with Nestholma founders to discuss about actual matters. The startups also set themselves 
weekly goals and reported their progress and achievements at the beginning of every week. The 
weekly structure was designed to support the startups’ development and to help them to stay 
concentrated on their goals. 
 
  
3.2 Selection of the research method, viewpoint and the research units  
 
The aim of this study is to analyse and understand the selected case, the collaboration process 
between Yle and Nestholma (Media Startup Accelerator Program) and identify and discuss the 
success factors in corporate start-up accelerator projects. Due to the character of this subject, a 
single case study is the most relevant option to analyse this case comprehensively. I am using 
holistic design for the case study (Yin 2003, 40) where all three research units, the big company 
(Yle), the company that organized the accelerator program (Nestholma) and startups that 
participated in the program, are selected for the analysis. 
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Single case study is especially useful when there is relatively little previous research and when 
the goal of the research is to get a holistic understanding of certain phenomena, which are 
strongly related to a specific context. Case study itself is the most suitable way to understand 
complex social phenomena and for example managerial processes. It has an ability to deal with 
a full variety of evidence, such as interviews and observations. (Yin 2003.) Because there are 
no possibilities for laboratory settings, the investigator or researcher should always choose an 
event where he or she has only little or no control at all for manipulating the situation, people’s 
behavior or influencing the direction of findings and conclusions. According to Yin (2003) case 
studies have a lack of rigor and moreover can be confused with case study teaching, which is 
not the same as case study research. It's also known that single-case studies are not providing 
relatively much basis for scientific knowlegde. 
 
 
3.3 The theoretical framework: stages of the collaboration process 
  
For the theoretical framework, a 5-stage process model by Averett (et al. 2000) will be used. 
The collaboration process between two actors can be divided into five stages (Averett et al. 
2000). The first stage of the process starts by introducing the process and planning the first 
steps. The second stage is about setting up the teams and building up common understanding. 
This includes for example establishing representative membership and determining the ground 
rules for communication. In the third stage it’s time to agree on a vision, identify and prioritize 
issues and set up goals. In the fourth stage common strategies will be developed, necessary 
tasks determined and evaluation methods established. In addition to these, it's time to monitor 
the whole process and expand network opportunities. On the fifth and last stage the team 
effectiveness is evaluated and impact will be increased. 
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Table 3. Stages of a collaboration process. (According to Averett et al. 2000.) 
Stage 1 - Getting started   Introducing the process 
     Planning the first steps 
     Creating a vision 
     Identifying the starting points 
     Getting together 
     Building trust   
 
 
Stage 2 – Mobilizing the team Building common understanding 
     Determining the ground rules 
     Finding the resources 
     Identifying the key roles   
Stage 3 – Setting the direction Agree on a vision 
     Identifying and prioritizing the tasks 
     Developing a mission 
     Setting the team goals 
     Communicating the message 
     Finding and developing the resources 
     Developing a strategic plan 
 
Stage 4 – Taking the action  Determining the tasks 
     Continue developing the strategies 
     Expanding the project network 
     Managing the work and monitoring the process 
     Planning and implementing the activities 
     Staffing 
     Establishing the evaluation methods 
Stage 5 – Reviewing and refining Increasing project effectiveness and impact 
     Taking the next steps to expand 
     Evaluating the team effectiveness 
     Creating visibility and involving the community 
     Engaging the audience 
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3.4 Data collecting 
 
The study was conducted in 2015 by interviewing three representatives of Yle, two of 
Nestholma and one startup that participated in the program. In total, five semi-structured 
interviews were done that were the primary source of data. The goal of the interviews was to 
build a comprehensive image of what happened during the accelerator program, what kind of 
roles were the key actors taking and what made the program successful or unsuccessful from 
the interviewees’ point of view. 
  
The interviewees were selected based on their working status during the program. Both 
founders of Nestholma were interviewed. From Yle the chief partnership officer and chief 
operations officer were included, as well as one of the mentors, who currently worked as the 
head of development at Yle. In addition to Yle and Nestholma, a founder of one startup was 
interviewed. The startups entered the process during the third and the fourth stage in Averett’s 
collaboration model, so evaluating the earlier stages of the process was not possible from their 
side. 
  
 
3.5 Conducting the interviews 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and based on the 5-stage process model (see table 1). 
During the interviews the aim was to go through the collaboration process, starting from stage 
one, and on every stage identify the key roles evaluate the success of the program and talk 
about possible ideas for development. The questions made during the interview (who did, what 
they did, when they did, what went well and what should have been done differently) were 
repeated in every interview and in some cases the interviewees were asked to comment on a 
specific statement by previously interviewed persons to get as rich data as possible.  
 
The viewpoint in this research is mostly to look at the collaboration process from the viewpoint 
of a big company. That is why among the interviewees there are three persons from YLE and 
only one from the startups. An interview from the startup’s point of view might provide a 
different perspective. 
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Table 4. The interviewed persons in this case study.  
Organisation Position     Date  Duration 
YLE   COO       30.4.2015 35min 
YLE  Chief Partnership Officer (accelerator  17.4.2015 39min 
                        project manager role from Yle’s side) 
YLE   Mentor     5.5.2015 31min 
Nestholma  CEO      21.4.2015 42min 
Nestholma Co-founder / Chairman of the board  21.4.2015 23min 
Startups  COO of one startup    15.7.2015 67min 
 
 
At the beginning of the interview, the interviewees received information about the research 
topic and the purpose of the research. They were told that the aim of the interviews was to build 
a holistic picture of the program, to identify the roles of key actors in different stages of the 
collaboration process between Nestholma and Yle and to try to point out the key factors that 
made the program successful or unsuccessful. At first, the stages of a process were introduced, 
and a short description of the stages was left on the table for the interviewee to look at during 
the interview. Then, starting from the first stage of the process, the interviewees told about the 
key person involved in a specific stage of the process and described what they did and which 
responsibilities they had. In every stage the interviewees were asked if they felt that something 
in the program worked extremely well and if something could have been done better. In 
addition to this, they were asked if they felt that some important roles were missing during 
some stage of the process. 
  
The interviews were recorded and short summaries were written after every interview. The 
interviewees were told that their names will not be published in the research, but that they 
might be identifiable based on their positions in their companies. Because there were no 
sensitive or confidential issues discussed in the interviews, this would not be a problem. The 
interview summaries are not published in this study. 
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4. Findings 
 
During the interview process I was able to hear five different recapitulations of the Media 
Startup Accelerator program. In general the interviewees were repeating the same issues 
concerning key actors and their roles during the process. But when they were asked about the 
problems, they often mentioned different factors. 
 
4.1 Expectations of the outcomes 
 
Because I was involved in the accelerator program and collaboration process during the whole 
autumn, I had several expectations of outcomes. I felt that Yle probably didn't know exactly 
what they actually wanted from the program. They maybe felt that the project was interesting 
and worth trying, but forgot to set goals and measure the success of the project. From 
Nestholma's perspective I felt that the project was pretty much what they expected, except that 
Yle didn't take any responsibility for marketing the program outside their company.  
 
 
4.2 The Media Startup Accelerator – Combining the stories of interviewees 
 
In this section I briefly summarize the most essential and frequently repeated issues in the 
interviews. The process was divided into five stages and the results of the interviews are 
presented stage by stage (see table 1). The aim of the interviews was to determine what roles 
there were between the key actors during specific stages of the program. To learn as much as 
possible about the case, the interviewees were also asked to describe what worked well during 
the program and what could have been done differently if a similar project would be done 
again.  
 
 
Stage 1 – Getting started – Introductions and first sketches  
To approach Yle successfully, Nestholma decided to introduce their accelerator to Yle’s chief 
operations officer who they knew personally, and who also had knowledge about startups. 
Because of this relationship, the trust between the parties was already strong from the 
beginning. 
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According to Yle’s chief operations officer, it was relatively easy to get started with the project 
when Nestholma presented their idea of the upcoming accelerator program. For them, the 
program was well-structured and clear, mostly because they already had one accelerator 
collaboration project a year earlier. At the same time, Yle was looking for new opportunities to 
open its operations a bit more. For example, some years ago they started the LoftHelsinki 
project in order to attract new small companies and creative people to work in the same 
building as Yle. However, they didn’t consider participating in an accelerator program before 
Nestholma introducted the idea of the program for them. Still, concrete goals were missing or 
were not discussed in the beginning. 
 
”It was a very good timing for this kind of project proposition. Yle has just 
 started to open its operations and this accelerator project was a very interesting 
proposal.” Yle chief operations officer 
  
 ”The role of  Yle in the beginning could have been a bit more active. It seems that  
they didn't know how they should behave, because this was relatively new for them.” 
Nestholma CEO 
 
When Yle’s management was convinced and got rid of their uncertainty they started to talk 
about the program within Yle’s organization. According to the interviewees, the operative level 
workers seemed to be very interested about the program, even though some believed that this 
kind of program would set too high expectations and lead to disappointments. 
 
 
Stage 2 – Mobilizing the team  
When Yle decided to become a partner in the accelerator program, they nominated  their chief 
partnership officer as a project manager for the upcoming program. That person had no 
previous experience about startups, but had a strong interest to work with them. He also was 
familiar with Yle’s organisation and was well connected in the organization.  
 
The key issue during the second stage was communication. Some interviewees claimed that 
there was too little communication, while some were satisfied. According to the interviewees, 
the project planning in the beginning was unstructured. For Yle’s chief partnership officer, who 
was in a project manager role from Yle’s side, the goals and the context of the project remained 
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a bit unclear. It was relatively hard to decide who to involve in the project as mentors, because 
no one at Yle knew what the startups were going to be. It was also a bit unclear for Yle what 
kind of rules and practices there would be during the program and what Nestholma was 
expecting from them. Because of the unclear situation, Yle divided tasks and responsibilities 
individually. 
 
”It was a bit unclear what kind of rules and practices there would be during  
the program, and what is Nestholma expecting from us” Yle chief operations officer 
 
”There should have been more communication and more structured plans  
 in the beginning of the project.” Yle chief partnerships officer 
 
”In general it felt a bit strange that we continued planning the project with  
Nestholma without any written agreements” Yle chief partnerships officer 
 
 ”To start the project was relatively easy, because we knew one key person from  
Yle and we had no need to rush with written agreements” Nestholma CEO 
 
In addition to the agreed partnership with Yle, Nestholma started to search for additional 
partnerships together with Yle. For Nestholma it was a good opportunity to get doors opened 
for next partnership negotiations and for Yle it was above all a learning experience and a way 
to do things in a new way. According to Yle’s chief partnerships officer, it was very interesting 
to plan together this kind of a project. The common wish was that Yle would select the specific 
business areas and then Nestholma would select the startups. In the end, Nestholma suggested 
the business areas themselves, based on the impression they had from discussions with Yle. 
 
 
Stage 3 – Setting the direction – Final preparations for the program 
 
After confirming the deal with Yle, Nestholma was careful to ensure that Yle wouldn’t back off. 
Especially after The Federation of the Finnish Media Industry (Viestinnän keskusliitto) made a 
public inquiry about Yle’s role in the program, there was a potential risk that Yle would reconsider 
its participation in the program. However, Yle decided to continue in the project as planned. The 
interviewees said that actually Yle could have avoided these kind of issues by communicating more 
clearly what they actually were doing and the reason why a public organization should participate in 
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a program like this.  
 
The lack of marketing effort from Yle was a clear disappointment for Nestholma. Yle has great 
distribution channels, but in this case they used them very selectively to market the program. There 
were some articles on Yle’s website about the cooperation project and the upcoming accelerator 
program, but a lot more visibility could have easily been achieved. Inside the organisation there was 
some communication about the program and several people got interested and wanted to know more 
about what was going on. According to the interviewees, in general everyone were curious about 
the program in a positive way. 
 
”Nestholma seemed to be disappointed that we didn’t do that much marketing  
from Yle’s side” Yle chief partnerships officer 
 
The matchmaking between mentors and startups could have been done better. There were several 
experts from Yle who invested their time relatively much in this project. Because of this, more 
attention should have been paid to make sure that the needs of every startup really met with the help 
that a mentor was able to provide. 
 
From Yle’s side the goal was to familiarize their own people to work with startups and to let them 
see how things actually are done in a startup environment. Yle also wanted to form relationships 
with media-related startups that probably could help them to improve their product development 
processes, but also to help startups enter the field of media business. 
 
The selection process of the startups was divided into two sections. First, every team filled an 
application at F6S, which is a widely-used adjustable platfrom for different kinds of program 
applications. After receiving around 100 applications for the accelerator program by the deadline, 
twenty best teams were shortlisted based on application evaluations made by Nestholma, Yle and 
some mentors outside these organizations. Those twenty teams came to pitch their ideas in the front 
of a jury that consisted of people from Nestholma, Yle, Tekes and Elisa, which was the other 
partner company in the accelerator program. The final decisions regarding the selections were made 
based on a two-minute sales pitch. In the end, twelve teams were invited to participate in the 
program and eight of them decided to use the opportunity. Four teams backed off, mostly because 
they were unable to engage all their time for the program during the upcoming three months. The 
interviewees felt that the recruiting process of startups was very successful from all perspectives, 
even though every team did not want to participate. 
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Stage 4 – Taking action – Running the accelerator program 
 
Already before the startups were chosen and the accelerator program started, Yle recruited an 
external coordinator to run the operational work for the program. This also helped Yle’s chief 
partnership officer to focus on other work instead of managing daily operations. The new project 
coordinator did not know people at Yle, which turned out to be a little bit problematic. For example 
the project coordinator was unable to identify suitable people from Yle for different needs, because 
she wasn’t familiar with their background, work history or capabilities well enough. 
 
The first mentors for the program were selected already before the accelerator program startups 
were chosen. This resulted in unsuitable matches in some cases. However, Yle was flexible and 
made some changes whenever they realized that interests were not matching or that the mentor has 
very limited time and resources. There was a lot of discussion about how much time Yle’s 
employees could use for mentoring startups and to work with them. No strict guidelines for time 
issues were given. 
 
The program would have needed a lot more visibility both inside and outside Yle’s 
organisation. People who worked at Yle, but were not personally involved in the program, 
surprisingly often didn’t know at all that there was a startup accelerator program in their 
company. According to the interviewees, there are always many different projects going on at 
Yle, but an innovation project like this would have deserved more visibility. Three of the five 
interviewees felt that Yle was communicating too little about the program. 
 
 
”There should have been a lot more communication and visibility both inside and outside 
Yle during this stage. There is no clear reason for the lack of communication. No one just 
did that, because it wasn’t anyone’s task.” Yle chief operations officer 
 
”Inside Yle’s organization they had sometimes too little information about what was 
happening. More communication would have been needed” Nestholma CEO  
 
 
Yle project coodinator’s responsibilities increased when she started to know the organization better 
and, accordingly, the chief partnership officer’s responsibilities decreased and he was able to 
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concentrate more on other tasks not related to the program. However, he continued to be the link 
between the startups and the mentors. Some mentors who were excited in the beginnning of the 
project left the project in quite an early stage. Some mentors lost their interest and some did not 
have enough spare time from their other tasks to participate in the accelerator program for a period 
of three months. 
 
During the three intensive accelerator months (16.9 -11.12.2014) everything was proceeding 
roughly as planned. Nestholma was expecting a more proactive attitude from some of the startups 
and more marketing and communication investments from Ylein compliance with the marketing 
responsibilities that were agreed at the beginning of the program.  
 
The accelerator program included weekly workshops with different themes, guest speaker sessions 
and the possibility to book meetings with Nestholma founders to discuss actual matters. During the 
program there were also some bigger events (startup day, mentor day and demo day) where mentors 
and startups were able to meet with each other and network. Demo day at the end of the program 
gave startups a possibility to meet potential investors and to be seen by Yle's executive committee. 
During the day, every startup pitched their ideas in the front of the audience and had their own stand 
for presenting their products. 
 
”Demo Day was great, and helped us to show the other people in Yle  
  concretely what was achieved during the program.” Yle chief operations officer 
 
 
Stage 5 - Reviewing and refining 
 
When the program was over, there were some meetings between key actors where they evaluated 
the whole program, how it worked and if something similiar should be done again. However, there 
was not a systematical evaluation on how successful the project was and if it met its goals. The 
problem with the evaluation was that the goals that were set were too abstract and there were no 
tools to measure how well the goals were achieved.  
 
”Now it would have been time to look back and evaluate if the project met  
its goals. The problem was that the goals that were set were too abstract”  
Nestholma CEO 
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”After the program everything just dissolved, without doing proper analysis of 
 what actually was done.” Yle chief operations officer 
 
At the end of the accelerator program the interviewees told that Yle realised that they should have 
communicated more about the program within their organisation to make their key people aware of 
it. In order to spread the word Yle invited the whole executive committee to participate in the Demo 
Day, the pitching event that was held on the last day of the accelerator program. For some of them, 
that event was the first time that they had heard about the accelerator that was started half a year 
ago in cooperation with Nestholma. 
 
 ”Anssi had the key role from Yle’s side and he did an excellent job.”  
 Yle chief operations officer 
 
After the program the hottest question for Yle was if they should do something like this again, 
and if yes, with whom and when. 
 
 
5. Discussion  
 
In this section the learnings from this accelerator case will be identified and suggestions on 
what could be done differently next time will be offered. Most importantly, a successful project 
has a linear structure and ongoing communications for all stakeholders, especially inside the 
large organization that participates the program. Because the process is also a learning project 
for everyone, participants should be open-minded enough to adapt different ways of working 
and learn from those.  
 
 
5.1 Collabaration with an accelerator as an innovation process 
 
Large corporations and startups typically have very different resources. While the corporation 
has financial resources, power, and the routines to run a proven business model efficiently, the 
startup has none of those, but typically has promising ideas, organizational agility, and the 
willingness to take risk and grow fast (Weiblen & Chesbrough 2015, 66). The aim of the 
collaboration with startups should therefore be to match these missing pieces together and to 
create promising innovations that immediately have access to corporate resources and business 
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knowledge. In this reseach, an accelerator has created the basis for the big company and the 
startup to meet and collaborate. 
 
 
5.2 The clash of working cultures 
 
In participating in the accelerator program, Yle wanted to try what this kind of program could 
have given for them. Based on the interviews, they did not set clear goals for the program. I got 
very diverse answers when asking about the goals for the program. Because of this I could 
assume that there actually were no clear goals for the program, or if they were, they were not 
communicated clearly between the key actors. After the program, the interviewees from Yle 
told that the program was a learning process for their employees. Of course this is a relevant 
and an essential goal for a big company, but should they also try to achieve some other goals? 
On the other hand, whatever the big company is satisfied with in the program, they probably 
are more willing to continue to cooperate with the startups also after the program. 
  
For Nestholma this was not the first time they were running this kind of an accelerator so they 
knew a bit better what they wanted for the program. Nestholma’s goal was to reach potential 
startups, get visibility as an accelerator provider and to make successful investments. To 
achieve these goals, they needed to match them with relevant goals for the startups and thw big 
companies. Nestholma wanted to bring together big companies and startups, help them to 
collaborate and to share knowledge and resources. For startups they offered mentoring, advice 
and a possibility to expand their network and access investors from abroad. 
  
Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015, 66-67) describe how many past efforts of putting together 
startups and big corporations have not lived up to their expectations and were quietly 
abandoned. According to them, the gap between the corporate and startup ways of working 
poses real challenges to getting both sides together. Based on their research, the major problem 
seems to be that the cultural differences often lead to misunderstandings and also the rhythm of 
the work in startups and big corporations is often very different. 
 
The way Yle as a company worked was totally different to Nestholmas way of working. 
Nestholma was also more like a startup company itself, while Yle had established ways of 
working. For example, Nestholma was able to continue discussions with possible partners 
without written contracts, but for Yle that would not have been possible. For Nestholma it was 
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important to help startups to grow and scale up their businesses, because they invested in every 
startup, whereas Yle as a public organization was not looking to profit or to grow their 
revenues. 
  
What big companies could maybe learn from startups would be the way to utilize ideas and 
innovations quickly. Almeida, Dokkob and Rosenkopfb (2003) demonstrated in their research 
how startups, when they grow, may have increasing opportunities to access and exploit external 
knowledge, but at the same time their motivation (and hence ability) to learn from more 
informal sources may decrease. In general, it would be interesting to see if organizations 
exploit technological opportunities differently based on their size. 
 
 
5.3 Planning and communicating the process 
 
Some interviewees from Yle felt that there was no linear structure for the accelerator program. 
However, it’s also possible that these opinions resulted from a lack of communication, because 
Nestholma had a very clear structure that covered at least stages 3 and 4 (picture 6). However, 
early-stage planning and program follow-up was not covered in these plans. 
  
 
Picture 6. The structure of Yle Media Startup Accelerator Program. Source: Nestholma. 
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5.4 Matchmaking between mentors and the startups 
 
Yle provided the accelerator program an access to their personnel and allowed the accelerator 
to access one person from Yle per team as mentors during the program. Yle, mostly based on 
their own interest and possibilities to participate, selected the mentors. All the selected mentors 
were working in top-level positions in Yle. Besides mentors from Yle, Nestholma offered their 
personal contacts for startups. The aim with that was to expand the network of every startup as 
much as possible. Elisa, the other company that also participated in the accelerator program 
was also doing mentoring, but they only involved a couple of their employees in the project. 
 
According to the feedback that was collected at the end of the program from the startup teams, 
the mentors were motivated to help and most of them had relatively good time resources for 
arranging weekly or monthly meetings. However, some startup teams thought that the help that 
the mentors provided was not exactly what they needed. The startups were mostly looking from 
their mentors for connections to key people in their field, to potential partner companies or to 
customers. Sometimes the mentors were able to provide new ideas or other useful information 
that helped startups to develop their actual products. 
  
The mentors were given guidelines on how to proceed with the startups and what kind of 
support they’re supposed to provide, but despite of this, some of them felt that they did not 
really know how they could have helped. According to the startup teams, some of the mentors 
felt that they didn’t know enough about the business that the startups were doing. 
  
The best mentors don’t necessarily have to be top-level workers in the organization. It’s 
possible that those people might have larger networks in the organization and possibilities to 
make independent decisions if needed (for example related to possible collaboration projects), 
but their working environment is often completely different from the startup companies’ hands-
on culture. The best solution for mentoring, according to the interviews made for this research, 
could be mentoring in pairs. The mentoring pair would consist of one mentor working in the 
mid-level of an organization and one working in the top level. That could be an optimal 
combination in order to share different viewpoints. 
 
”Mentors don’t have to be top-level executives. Operational-level workers 
could have more practical support to give for the startups.” Nestholma CEO 
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One solution could be to form mentoring pairs from top-level and operational level workers. 
That could give possibilities for all three parties to learn more and form new relationships and 
collaborative projects. It could lead to a win-win-win situation both inside the bigger company 
and regarding the relationship between startups and mentors. Another way to improve the 
mentoring system could be the mentoring of mentors, or just sharing thoughts with other 
mentors during the process and learning from each other. Alternatively, very detailed 
guidelines for the mentoring process could be provided, but that could easily lead to sticking to 
them instead of focusing on the most relevant problems. 
  
In general, the mentoring relations in this program worked quite well and were logically 
planned. In some cases the mentors were not sure, how they could help and what exactly was 
expected of them. Due to this, everyone was not that active or was not able to provide the kind 
of help that would have been needed. A driving force for mentoring relations could be a good 
idea in the future. What Nestholma asked the mentors to do was pretty much just opening the 
door to startups and providing them with market and customer insights. Mentors were not 
asked to provide any new ideas.  
 
A successful mentoring relationship requires loyalty from the mentees and provides self-
satisfaction in exchange to the mentor, when he/she can see ideas grow and succeed. Mentoring 
also increases the mentor’s own knowledge. In addition to this, a study that focused on the 
benefits of mentors in mentoring process revealed that after a mentoring period the group with 
mentoring experience reported better career success and higher salaries than their non-
mentoring collagues. (Bland et al. 2009.) According to Koskinen and Tossavainen (2003), a 
mentoring relationship can be both a rewarding and a frustrating experience from a mentor’s 
point of view. 
  
Richard Geibel (2015) researched the factors that startups consider being critical for their 
success. He researched several startups in Germany and in the US and identified 25 success 
factors that he grouped into ‘internal factors’, ‘external factors’ and ‘support from 
incubator/accelerator’. According to his research, mestorship was valued as one of the most 
important takeaways from an accelerator program. 
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Picture 7. The most important types of support from incubator/accelerator for a startup (Geibel 
2015). 
 
What makes a good mentor? An experienced mentor should be able to help the startup to avoid 
general mistakes that less experienced entrepreneurs are likely to make (Geibel 2015). The 
mentor should support the founding team to learn and identify the most successful business 
models as fast as possible. Sometimes mentors could also provide startups with connections to 
venture capitalists or possible partners. 
 
 
5.5 Measuring the success and recalling the goals   
According to the interviews, Yle did not set very clear common goals for the program, but at 
least two issues mentioned during the interviews are worth noting. In collaborating with the 
accelerator program and getting to know several startups,Yle thought that they could continue 
to collaborate with startups if they would find something that fits their business well. However, 
they did not very actively participate in the selection of startups. 
 
The other goal for Yle was to educate their own people and to give them a possibility to try and 
learn something new. For most of them, the world of early-stage startup companies and their 
ways of working was completely new. The problem is that these goals can’t be measured 
easily. After the program, Yle could evaluate if they found something interesting or if someone 
learned something,  
 
”We had no previous experience from startups”  
 Yle chief partnership officer & one of the mentors at Yle 
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”Now I have a possibility to utilize the knowledge of mobile application development 
process in my own work at Yle, if I want to.” One of the mentors at Yle 
 
Nestholma instead had a very clear list of benefits and goals they presented in the beginning of 
the program (picture 8) that covered the benefits for the big company as well as the benefits for 
the startup. However, some of the interviewees had very big difficulties to recall these goals in 
the interview. Probably the problem was that the goals offered by Nestholma were too abstract 
and difficult for Yle to integrate to any specific project or problem. In the end, it seems that Yle 
was setting slightly different goals for themselves than these suggested goals and benefits that 
were supposed to guide the whole accelerator program. 
 
 
Picture 8. Accelerator program goals and benefits by Nestholma.  
 
One of the major problems in the accelerator was the lack of common activities. According to 
some of the interviewees, there was no point to build an accelerator program if there were no 
concrete projects to do together or specific problems to solve. On the other hand, some 
interviewees argued that it’s more important to learn together and get to know each other 
before making any bigger projects to happen. Most of the key people from Yle who were 
involved in the project said afterwards that it was a very good educational experience for them. 
In that case it’s very relevant to ask if an accelerator program would be the best way to educate 
corporate employees to adapt new kind of innovation and product development mindset or 
would there be lighter ways to get started.  
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“Sometimes a big company doesn’t know immediately what to do with startups” 
 Nestholma CEO 
 
 
Some of the people interviewed were also asked how they personally feel about measuring the 
success of an accelerator program. The suggestions for measuring were, for example, counting 
the number of pilot project executed in collaboration with the startups that participated in the 
accelerator or the number of startups acquired by the corporation. For startups, the key to 
success can be obtaining financing or a valuable contact provided by the partner company or 
the accelerator.  For the accelerator provider, the most important indicator of success is 
probably the amount of startups that will stay alive also after the program and, ultimately, the 
number of profitable exits the accelerator makes. 
 
However, making a successful exit can take many years. Before that, the accelerator success 
could be estimated, for example, based on the valuation of its porfolio companies. For 
relatively new accelerators it’s however too early to evaluate their success based on this, 
because the companies could be difficult to value (Fankhauser 2013). Still, accelerators can’t 
guarantee success for every startup. The accelerator, including all the networks, mentorships 
and contacts, can help the startup to stay alive, but the hardest work, running the business and 
making it successful, remains for the startup. 
 
In Yle Media Startup Acclerator case, it could be relevant to find out if this accelerator program 
has encouraged any other companies to collaborate with startups, accelerator providers or to 
start internal accelerator programs. 
 
For Nestholma as a small and relatively unknown company it was a great opportunity to partner 
with Yle, because Yle with its well-know brand and excellent resources was able to “open 
doors” for a smaller company that tries to get next deals with big companies. Yle also has good 
communication and marketing channels as well as wide networks that would have been a great 
advantage for Nestholma if those communication and marketing channels would have been 
used. 
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5.6 Roles of key actors in the accelerator program 
 
Most importantly, a successful project has enough key actors involved during the whole 
process, starting from first scratches, continuing through various events and finally 
summarizing the whole project and planning the next steps. The other element that is needed is 
a linear structure and an ongoing communication for all stakeholders, especially inside the 
participating organisation. 
 
Table 5. The key actors in Media Startup Accelerator  
Organisation Position     Work time used for accelerator*  
YLE   COO       Very little 
YLE  Chief Partnership Officer (accelerator  10-20% 
                        project manager role from Yle’s side) 
YLE   Project coordinator     30-50% 
YLE   Mentors (in total 12 mentors from Yle)  5% 
Nestholma  CEO      70-90% 
Nestholma Co-founder / Chairman of the board  70-90% 
Nestholma Project coordinator    100% 
Startups  (in total 8 teams)    40-80% 
* = The amount of the working is based on personal evaluations and discussions during the program 
 
To get started with the project, there has to be at least one key actor from the participating 
organization who has a strong motivation to execute the project, possibility to make decisions 
and access to the right people within the organization. To get this project started, Nestholma 
first approached Yle’s chief operations officer. He was already familiar with Nestholma and 
their accelerator concept, which helped to build trust between parties during this stage. In the 
beginning Yle’s chief operations officer had a very important role in taking the idea forward to 
the right people at Yle that he had access to. 
  
One important success factor has definitely been Yle’s chief partnership officer’s 
comprehensive role and his own interest to make the program run as fluently as possible. All 
interviewees repeated that his role was the most important during the program, from a very 
early stage (practically from stage 2) until the end of the program. He was personally very 
motivated to push the project forward and he helped to find just the right people from Yle’s 
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organization to get involved with the project. He tried to predict possible conflicts and 
prevented them before they occurred. 
  
Yle’s chief partnership officier had responsibility for being the key contact person for the 
project, but he was not officially nominated as project manager. Instead, Yle recruited a new 
project coordinator that came outside Yle’s organization during the planning stage of the 
program. It was not the best choice to choose someone who wasn’t familiar with Yle and its 
human resources in the organization, because often it was essential to know the key people and 
their capabilities personally. In the beginning of the program Yle’s chief partnership officer had 
the biggest responsibility to run even some operational level work but during the program a 
great amount of responsibilities was moved to the project coordinator. 
 
There were big differences between mentors on how they participated in the program. Some of 
them were active in the beginning of the program and wanted to participate in the planning 
stage, while some of them became active when they met their startups teams and only wanted 
to focus on helping them. 
  
In Nestholma there were three different roles during the program: the founders of Nestholma 
invested in the startups and concentrated on helping them and at the same time they developed 
the accelerator program operations further. They also started the cooperation process by asking 
Yle to become a partner for the accelerator. When the program was confirmed, Nestholma 
recruited a project coordinator to market the program, run everyday operational level processes 
and take care of the startups. In addition to these, Nestholma provided their contact network for 
the startups, for example by organizing guest speaker sessions and introducing teams to 
potential investors. 
  
During the planning stage of the program there were several people from Yle wanted to get an 
introduction and to hear more about the program. Even though quite few of them finally got 
involved, it was good to introduce the project to as many as possible. 
 
“There has to be someone from the executive level to push the project forward and talk 
to the right people in a big company.” Nestholma CEO 
 
 
When executing a new innovation process, there are some roles that key actors in the project 
have to take. Koch, Kautonen and Grünhagen (2006) have identified some key tasks that are 
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essential for a successful collaboration project. There are six different tasks, two external and 
four internal. The two external tasks include the acquisition of funds and maintaining a positive 
public image for the network. The first two internal tasks concern facilitating and managing 
network operations and processes as well as maintaining relationships within the network. The 
third internal task involves managing entries to and exits from the network. This task was 
considered especially important because it has an important role in monitoring the network 
structure in order to avoid overlap and internal competition. The fourth task includes the 
responsibility for interventing when critical situations in the project occur. 
 
According to Yamada (2004, in Koch 2006), heterogenous actors are needed in this kind of 
cooperation to make it more successful, because partners also have different interests and they 
have to be able to rely on the relevance of cooperation.  
 
It’s difficult to say if any important roles in this project were missing. My own suggestion 
would have been to hire a project manager not connected with the three parties (Yle, Nestholma 
and startups) to make sure that communication worked and that the program met it’s goals from 
everyone’s viewpoint. In this case, there were two project coordinators, one from Yle and one 
from Nestholma, with limited common working time and with totally different briefings to their 
tasks. The project coordinator/manager however would probably have the best overview of the 
whole process, so it would be extremely important to make sure that everyone working in those 
positions are aware of the goals for the program. In this case, both project coordinators should 
have been involved much earlier in the program in order to become more familiar with the 
goals and the project’s structure. 
 
Nestholma’s role in this accelerator was to bring together big and small companies, in this case Yle 
and eight media-related startups. One of the reasons for matchmaking was to help startups to get 
started with their businesses and to speed up their product development processes with the help of a 
big company’s knowledge and experience. Also, Nestholma helped startups develop new ideas, take 
them to the next level and enter the market successfully.  
 
”It is important that the collaboration will not remain just between the startup and the big 
company. The network should actively be expanded all the time.” Nestholma CEO 
 
”Small companies don’t know how to grow, and the big ones are not interested enough to 
help.” Nestholma CEO 
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”Startups are not ready packages and it takes a lot of resources to develop them into 
successful companies. That is not the big company’s responsibility, but collaboration could 
give something to both.” Nestholma CEO 
 
It is also important that these activities get visibility inside the organization. A big company that 
participates in the program should communicate the project both inside and outside their 
organization and make everyone know about what is going on. It is especially important to keep the 
key actors updatedwhile not forgetting the other stakeholders or those who are working in the same 
organisation, but who are not involved in that specific project. 
 
 
5.7 What happened after the program? 
 
After the program, no mutual evaluations about what went well and what should have been 
done differently. In order to get the most out of the program, it would probably have been a 
good idea to gather the key actors from both companies around same table and to summarise 
the project and to evaluate if the project met its goals. Nestholma and Yle did meet after the 
program, but the discussions covered mostly their future cooperation possibilities. 
 
If Yle was interested to participate in the accelerator program, why didn’t they carry out a 
public bidding process to find the best possible accelerator available on market? The reason for 
choosing just Nestholma can be very simple: personal relations between key actors that built on 
a strong trust between the parties in the beginning of the program. Trust is something you can’t 
create from scratch when starting new projects with new partners, which makes it an extremely 
difficult factor to value.  
 
When big companies are collaborating with accelerators they are most likely looking for 
partnerships, new innovations to apply in their own business operations, or even acquisitions. 
In Yle’s case, the main reason to collaborate with the accelerator was to get to know each other 
and to learn from different working cultures. Yle was interested in new partnerships, but they 
weren’t really looking for acquisitions. New innovations were a bit difficult to integrate in their 
existing business, because Yle did not have specific enough problems to solve. 
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For Yle the program was a possibility to try something new and to look for alternative ways of 
working and collaborating with innovative companies. If an accelerator helps startups to focus 
on their current innovation process, in this case the accelerator also pushed Yle to constantly 
talk about their development work and to face the areas of their business that are under 
development.  
  
When analyzing the benefits of the program in general, we should evaluate quality and 
systematicness. Are the benefits generated randomly or are they in line with the goals? When 
executing any kind of project, it’s likely to generate at least some benefits for everyone but 
those benefits may not guarantee the next similar project. 
 
 
5.8 When to consider an accelerator?  
 
Based on the results of this research, it might be possible that a startup accelerator is the most 
profitable way of collaboration when the corporation has done its SWOT-analysis carefully. In 
other words, they have to be well aware of their weaknesses and current threats, but also be able to 
identify their existing strengths and some possible solutions to their problems.  
 
Knowing the weaknesses and threats of a corporation will make the basis for a collaboration 
process. The weak spots in existing businesses could be strenghtened by innovative startups who 
can provide their ideas and solutions for the corporation to use.  Also knowing the opportunities in 
the business environment is important for finding the most relevant innovations for the corporation. 
Identifying existing strenghts is something that the corporation can offer to the startups in exchange.  
 
For example, let’s assume that a traditional corporation has difficulties to utilize new digital 
opportunities. They still have a strong market position, stable cash flow and good market insight. 
However, there is a risk that a new innovative company can take over the market. Also, customers 
might change their consumption habits.  The corporation has recognized that they lack knowledge 
about digitalisation and their innovation and development processes are too slow and expensive. 
However, they see several possibilities in digitalisation for the future. Also, new products should be 
developed to prevent losing customers in case their consumption habits change. This scenario is 
presented in table 6. 
 
 
  
51 
Table 6.  SWOT-analysis of an example corporation. 
Strenghts  Strong market position 
   Cash flow, financial resources 
   Market insight and knowledge 
Weaknesses  Lack of digital knowledge 
   Slow innovation processes 
Opportunities  New products or product categories 
   Digital opportunities 
   More effective or automatized business 
Threats  New competitors with innovative products 
   Customers’ consumption habits change 
 
 
Knowing the current market situation and being able to position the corporation is a good 
starting point for a successful project. To make the project happen, some other important 
resources are needed. A more detailed toolkit for big companies that are considering 
participating in an accelerator program is presented in the next chapter. As a summary, based 
on this research the most important resources are presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7. The most important resources for startup collaboration from the corporation’s viewpoint 
1. Financial resources and talented key people who can invest time in the project 
2. Excellent project management knowledge, including marketing, communication and time 
management. 
3. Strong motivation for everyone who participates in the program and a clear vision on why the 
collaboration  project is done and what the goals are. 
4. Succesful matchmaking between the key people in the corporation, the startups and the mentors. 
 
 
 
5.8.1 Lessons learned - How to build a successful accelerator 
 
Before going to the list of general advices for running these kind of projects, I would like to 
highlight a couple of specific findings from the Media Startup Acclelerator program. The 
interviewees said that in the beginning of the program, the common trust and personal relations 
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were the most important things with getting started. Also during the whole program, the accelerator 
providers said that the trust in general is more valuable than legal agreements. At the same time, 
some interviewees from Yle felt that they would have needed more communication and a more 
clearly written plan. One possible solution for this problem would have been more frequent 
meetings with all the key people involved in the accelerator program in which issues would have 
been disussed and settled together with written memos produced from those meetings. 
 
This toolkit is based on the interview summaries and it offerssome guidelines about the key 
roles, responsibilities, and things to consider in different stages of the program. The learnings 
presented here are mostly based on this case study, the Yle Media Startup Accelerator Program, 
and the interviews I made with the key people involved. Therefore, these guidelines may not 
apply to all startup collaboration projects, because every company is different and has different 
goals. However, these learnings may provide a very good starting point for planning a 
collaboration project and evauating the possible outcomes and helping to avoid some mistakes.  
 
 
5.8.2 The toolkit for getting started with corporate accelerators 
 
The selection process 
To get the most out of a program, a lot attention should be paid to the selection of startups and to 
evaluating how their innovations matches with a corporation’s needs and the accelerator program’s 
goals.  
 
Communication inside the corporation 
It’s important to keep everyone in the organization updated about what is happening, including 
those who are not participating in the project. However, it is most important to constantly 
communicate with the persons who are involved, such as mentors, project managers, startup teams, 
other stakeholders, etc.. If the key people are confused about what is going on, the project is 
unlikely to be very successful. Everyone should stay aware of what actually is supposed to happen, 
when and what kind of responsibilites each key actor has during the process and what is expected of 
them. 
 
Setting the goals  
The big company should be very clear on how they’re willing to benefit from an acceleration 
program. Defining the reasons to participate in the project and setting relevant goals for the 
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program is a crucial step for succeeding. In addition to this, make sure that everyone 
understands them. And again, communications inside the organization, to stakeholders and 
other possible interest groups, should not be forgotten. Make it clear for everyone why the 
company is participating in the program. 
 
Structuring the program  
Deciding the accelerator program structure (lengths, daily schedules, checkpoints, etc) together 
with the key people might be a good idea. During the program it’s important that everyone is 
able to understand what the program contains, what happens, when and where. It’s also good to 
agree beforehand if attendance for startups is mandatory or not.  In case that the accelerator 
program in very intensive, for example if it contains workshops and guest lectures every day, 
the startups can concentrate less on their core business. 
 
Agreeing on practical issues 
When working with a startup accelerator that is powered by someone else, agreeing on 
practical issues is important. For example, who pays running or additional costs (such as 
events), who does marketing and how the marketing is done (which channels are used, budget 
etc.) and who has the major responsibility of communication. 
 
Involving the right people 
Make sure that there are enough resources for the project in the company. Running an 
accelerator takes time and also a bit of knowledge about startups, or at least a very curious 
mindset. Involving right people with suitable skills, time resources and motivation is not the 
easiest task, but probably the most important one. The selected people should be given specific 
roles and responsibilities so that they know what they’re supposed to do during the program.  
 
Marketing activities and visibility 
Before any program starts, the partner company should actively participate in the planning of 
marketing operations. This ensures that already the applying startups are aware of what kind of 
ideas and teams the program is looking for. The marketing material, communication and 
communication channels during the startup recruiting process should be designed according to 
the teams that are the most wanted.  
Also, make sure that the corporation knows what is going and how they could be involved, if 
they’re willing to. 
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Finding the excellent startups 
The first thing to think about before taking a look into startups is to define what kind of startups 
the company is looking for? Would it be enough to just have teams with brilliant ideas, or 
would it work better with early-stage companies with first prototypes. Or should the company 
skip the seed phase and collaborate with growth seeking, already established companies? Who 
could potentially best solvethe company’s problems? After making these decisions, the 
program should be tailored to the target group’s needs. If potential startups are not contacted 
directly, it might be good to pay some attention to making suitable marketing material and 
choosing suitable marketing channels.  
Bonus: it’s often better to choose a good team than a good product. 
 
Investments 
Risk-investments in startups are often the driving force for accelerator managers. Sometimes big 
companies are managing these accelerators without an external accelerator provider. In this case, 
Yle used Nestholma to run the Media Startup Accelerator Program. During the program Nesthoma 
invested 17.000 euros in every team that was accepted into the program. By making investments 
and taking shares from startup companies, the accelerator manager stays motivated to help startups 
and follow their development after the program. It could as well be the partner company that invests 
in startups, not necessary the accelerator, but investments in some form are likely to make the 
program more successful and engage parties in it. 
 
 
”This kind of accelerator should give tools and templates both for big companies and 
startups – not only facilitating, we should push startups forward” Nestholma CEO 
 
 
 
Macthmaking with care 
Making it easy to help will help mentors to provide the best possible value for the startups: tell 
them in as much detail as possible what they should do and how they could cooperate with the 
team or startup they're mentoring during the program. 
 
Sharing company cultures 
Big companies and startups usually have different working cultures. Because there is not only 
one right way to do things, everyone involved in the project should keep their eyes open and 
learn from each others’ cultures, evaluate them and pick the best practices for themselves to 
use. Learning the entrepreneurial startup-mindset can be one of the most valuable things for a 
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big company that a startup accelerator can provide. For startups the most valuable thing can be 
for example a relationship with a mentor from a big company who is able to share his/her 
experience. 
 
Doing things together 
What really brings small and big companies together is doing things together. It’s good to have 
concrete collaboration projects, try different prototypes and test as many things as possible. The 
big company should be lean and also involve customers in development projects, if possible. 
After the accelerator, a big company can integrate successful innovations in their existing 
business operations. 
 
Setting milestones for startups 
It’s a good idea to decide already in the beginning of the program what should be achieved, by 
whom and by which date. If the milestones are not directly measurable, agree on how they 
should be measured. For example, a startup should have at least 1000 downloads for their new 
app within one month of their launch. Also agree what happens if the milestone will not be 
achieved. However, it’s good to be flexible if needed. Sometimes a pivot is better alternative 
than achieving goals that don’t matter. 
 
Summarising 
After the program, all participants or at least the key people in the projects should sit down and 
summarise what was good, what was learned and what could be done differently next time. Too 
often projects end without proper feedback discussions. To maximize learning, those are one of 
the most important parts of the process. 
 
 
5.9 Evaluating the quality of the research  
 
Evaluating the research quality should be a continuous process from research design to data 
collection and analysis. The quality of the research process can be evaluated with several tests. 
Yin (2003, 33-37) introduces four most common used tests that are also relevant for case 
studies. These tests are measuring construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. In case studies, evaluating the construct validity is especially problematic, because 
measuring the data and having objective judgements while collecting the data is not 
automatically guaranteed (Yin 2003, 35). In other words, the results always more or less 
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depend on the researcher but in a high quality case study the researcher is eliminating its 
personal influence as much as possible. 
 
Also, relating different parts of the study to each other in a relevant way makes one of the 
challenges for a case study. For example, in this case study the accelerator process was 
observed from the viewpoint of a big company to find out the most critical issues that makes 
the project successful for them. That included evaluating the key people involved, the 
collaboration model and the structure of the project, and the results that the project had. All 
evaluation was based on the interviews I made within six months after the accelerator program 
was over. 
 
Yin (2003) highlights that when evaluating the external validity of the research, attention 
should be paid especially to considering if the results of the study are generalizable beyond the 
immediate case study. For example, in this case, a relevant question is if the results apply to 
other startup collaboration projects or to other startup accelerators. Is the list of key learnings 
applicable for all corporations planning to get started with startup collaborations? It would need 
several other researches to prove the feasibility of the “toolkit” this research provides for big 
companies, but because every company, startup and collaboration project is different, it might 
be impossible to create a 100% valid and satisfaction-guaranteeed guide to execute startup 
collaboration projects successfully. 
 
 
5.9.1 The amount of the data 
 
This study is based on one case, which doesn’t make it very comprehensive. Instead of trying to 
test any hypothesis or to make general conclusions, the case is used as an illustrative example 
of an accelerator program that is executed with a big company. This accelerator program is 
only a single case among other accelerators worldwide. I’m focusing on discussion about the 
key factors that can affect the successes or failures in accelerator programs based on this case 
and other existing theories about accelerators.  
 
Yin (2003) recommends using multiple sources of evidence. In this research case all three 
parties of the program (big company, accelerator provider and startups) are represented. 
However, there is only one interview with a representant from startups, but the main focus has 
been to clarify the process from company’s perspective. 
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5.9.2 Selection of the key informants 
 
One issue to critically evaluate in the discussion part is the selection of interviewees. Because 
the amount of time resources was limited, I needed to pick some persons that I subjectively 
assumed to be most relevant for the research. Koch, Kautonen and Grünhagen (2006) solved 
the selection problem by doing pre-interviews, where they asked the interviewees to point out 
some key persons to interview. In addition to the selection of interviewees, I had to evaluate 
how it might have affected the results that I more or less personally knew everyone that I 
interviewed, because they were working in a same project as I worked for six months. Could 
the interviewees, for example, answer the questions differently to me because they know me? 
Or can I trust those answers more, because they know that they should be honest, because I’m 
familiar with the accelerator program? The access to key people in the process was relatively 
easy, as well as identifying the most potential interviewees. 
 
I’m also going to discuss, if the research method was suitable or if I should have used some 
different research approach instead. I’ll also reflect the answers to the hypothesis and evaluate 
if they were something that I expected. Because I personally worked as a part of the accelerator 
program, it’s difficult look it from outside now.  It’s possible that I’ve had strong expectations 
regarding the outcomes of this research, which may affect the reliability of the research.  On the 
other hand, knowing the process personally can provide added value. 
 
 
5.9.3 Replication logic 
 
After interviewing the key actors and writing the research report I went through the results with one 
person from Nestholma, who also was one of the interviewees, and one person from Yle, who was 
not one of the interviewees, but participated actively in the process in the beginning and also later as 
a mentor. Both of them mostly agreed with the results, but also provided several additional 
viewpoints to the research. 
 
Because I personally was involved and worked in this accelerator project, I have my own 
subjective viewpoint to the process. On the other hand it is a huge advantage, because I was 
able to follow the whole process from the planning stage to the end, but on the other hand, I 
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can't completely get rid of some expectations that are based on my own experiences and 
perceptions. The research was based on interviews of five key actors of the program (not 
including myself), so only the way I set up and asked the interview questions could have 
influenced the results of the research. If the research would be repeated, I assume that the 
results would be the same.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
If big corporations recognize problems in their product development processes, an accelerator 
might be a potential solution to try. If the corporation has enough resources and knows their 
weaknesses and possibilities, a startup accelerator collaboration could be recommended. A 
collabaration process with an accelerator can provide very specific solutions for specific 
problems, but if the problems are not identified, it can be a waste of time. In can be a big risk to 
begin the startup collaboration as a first step of improving corporational product development 
processes, but if the program is executed well, it can also offer the corporation a lot.  The key 
takeaways from startup collaborations for a big company are presented in table 8. 
 
Table 8.  The key takeaways from startup collaborations for a big company 
Improving the internal product development processes 
Educating corporation’s employees to adopt the startup mindset 
Learning to collaborate with different companies and expanding networks 
Eliminating possible competitors 
Being able to develop several new solutions/products/technologies fast  
Possibility to do radical innovation and product testing without risking the corporation’s brand 
 
It seems that a successful accelerator has to have specific problems and clear targets. Most 
likely the lessons learned from this accelerator program and identified in this research would 
help the next accelerator provider or corporation to get started with their accelerator. By 
considering several of the key issues listed in “lessons learned”, a company might get some 
help in order to avoid the worst mistakes. 
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With mobile resources and suitable finance, entrepreneurs can start companies and bring new 
products to market relatively quickly (Freeman 2007). The challenge with corporate 
accelerators in general is the match between a company’s current product development 
challenges and the startups’ abilities to solve those with their own products or technologies. It 
easily happens that products and solutions match almost, but not perfectly. If the companies 
would like to find perfect or tailored solutions to their problems, they should collaborate with 
innovative teams instead of external startups, who already work on their own products. Having 
nice additional features to a corporation’s product selection produced by startups doesn’t solve 
any existing problems but, on the other hand, it can create new market segments and product 
categories. 
 
When collaborating with innovative teams, the company can introduce their problems and ask 
the teams to find solutions to a very specific task. The challenge in this model is to keep the 
team motivated. Startups in general are very motivated to develop their own products without 
any addional incentives, but other teams need to have other reasons to work.  
 
 
7.1 Suggestions for future research - The impact of the accelerator program? 
 
The aim of this research was to identify and discuss the success factors in corporate startup 
collaboration projects. The suggestions I have made based on one case study and existing 
literature might give a good starting point for corporations planning to execute collaboration 
projects. However, every upcoming collaboration case is different and guidelines provided in 
this research may not apply in all cases. In many corporations, the business field is changing so 
fast and dramatically that innovation management and product development processes might be 
done completely differently in some years. No one knows if startup collaboration suddenly 
becomes outdated. 
 
Probably most of the companies that participated in the media startup accelerator will die, but 
how many of them will continue developing new ventures in other companies after the 
accelerator? The teams or individual entrepreneurs and their willingness to create successful 
products will not disappear, even if their first (or second) project would fail. For investor the 
situation is tricky, because the seed money that is invested in one company is gone when the 
team decides to quit the project and focus on the next one. 
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But the big question is – has the accelerator selection process been so comprehensive that only 
the most entrepreneurial teams are getting into the program or does an accelerator have an 
impact of making those teams more entrepreneurial and pushing them forward to come up with 
new ventures also after then program? Of course no one knows if also those teams that did not 
get into the accelerator program are continuing as entrepreneurs or developing new ventures, 
but I assume it is not likely. 
 
One suggestion for future research is to try to find out how the startup teams, or people 
involved in those teams, changes during the accelerator program? What elements in the 
accelerator are those that possibly make the team members to become entrepreneurs also after 
the accelerator? Is it actually possible to see the accelerator as a school, where a side project or 
a hobby becomes a serious business?   
 
Another viewpoint for future research would be to find out what kind of impact a startup 
accelerator has on big corporations. For example, how corporate cultures, product development 
processes or corporate business models have changed after a startup collaboration? Is startup 
collaboration even more important for the business than listening to their customers? Are 
startups even closer to customers? 
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Appendix 1. A simplified model of the 5-stage model used in the interviews. 
 
 
Stage 1 - Getting started 
 
 
Stage 2 – Mobilizing the team 
 
 
Stage 3 – Setting the direction 
 
 
Stage 4 – Taking the action 
 
 
Stage 5 – Reviewing and refining 
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Appendix 2. The interview form. 
 
Interviewee:  
Date and time:  
Location:  
Duration of the interview: ___ minutes 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The interviewee received information about purpose of this master’s thesis topic and goals before 
the interview. The interviewee was told that the aim of this interview was to identify roles of key 
actors in different stages of the collaboration process between Nestholma and Yle. He was asked to 
describe the process and roles from his own point of view. 
 
The stages of a process were introduced, and a short description of stages was left on table for 
interviewee to see during the interview. 
 
 
Stage 1 
 
Key persons involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
Main activities done during the stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was done well, what should be done better next time: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key learnings: 
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Stage 2 
 
Key persons involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
Main activities done during the stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was done well, what should be done better next time: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key learnings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 3 
 
Key persons involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
Main activities done during the stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was done well, what should be done better next time: 
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Key learnings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 4 
 
Key persons involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
Main activities done during the stage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was done well, what should be done better next time: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key learnings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 5 
 
Key persons involved: 
 
 
 
 
 
Main activities done during the stage: 
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What was done well, what should be done better next time: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key learnings: 
 
 
 
 
 
